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Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose
Time Has Passed
JUDGE HOWARD C. BRATTON*
The judicial Power . . . shall extend ... to Controversies ...
between Citizens of different States.'
With these few words the Constitution sets forth the foundation
for the diveristy jurisdiction first conferred upon the federal courts by
the Judiciary Act of 1789. These same words have provoked a con-
troversy that has continued intermittently throughout our history, and
it is once again time to reexamine diversity jurisdiction to determine
whether it is justified in view of present day conditions and the work-
load facing the federal courts in litigation affecting federal rights.
The historical justification for federal diversity jurisdiction was
the need to assure an out-of-state litigant that there was a forum to
which he could resort where he need fear no bias, and where the reme-
dies afforded would be coextensive with rights created by state law and
enforceable in state courts. Much lip service has been paid to this fear
of state-court bias against the outsider, although it is far from certain
that this was a strong motivation for the insertion of the diversity
clause in the Constitution or its implementation in the first Judiciary
Act. Indeed, fear of state legislatures, and the belief that federal courts
would be creditors' and businessmen's courts, significantly influenced the
decision to provide for diversity jurisdiction.2 The supposed fear of
the hostility of state courts to litigants from other states did not play
the primary role it has since been assigned.3 Judicial interpretation
nevertheless made the idea a part of the constitutional clause.4
Even if it were to be assumed that the fear of bias against the out-
sider-litigant actually existed at the time of the framing of the Consti-
tution and at the time of enactment of the first Judiciary Act, and that
this apprehension continued in the nation's early days, there would still
remain the question whether such a fear is presently justified. It is con-
ceded by some of the most ardent supporters of diversity jurisdiction
that, if this fear is the only reason for its continuance, the jurisdiction
* United States District Court for New Mexico.
1U.S. Co NT. art. m, § 2.
2 Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HEAv. L. Rlv. 483, 492-
97 (1928).
31d.
4 See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Friendly,
supra note 2, at 492.
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should be eliminated.5 The American Law Institute has adopted this
Hamiltonian thesis as its rationale for the retention of diversity juris-
diction in a curtailed form, 6 although the justification for its continu-
ance has disappeared as a matter of fact.7
The possibility of bias against an out-of-stater is not the only
argument advanced in support of continuing the present system. There
is the argument that diversity jurisdiction serves as a cohesive force
in our country,8 so that its elimination would somehow retard a sense
of allegiance to the nation or perhaps would impede economic growth.
In a time when state ties have been weakened by the mobility of the
population, leaving a strong allegiance only to the nation, and when
business expansion takes place without a thought for the availability
of a federal forum for possible litigation, this argument, too, fails to
provide a basis for continuing diversity jurisdiction.
It has also been contended that justice is speedier in the federal
courts and that there may often be procedural advantages to trying
lawsuits in a federal forum rather than in state court, so that those
who can file there are being well-servedf The scholarly notion that
diversity jurisdiction is a vehicle for public service is supported by some
important bar groups who believe that diversity should remain un-
changed.' ° This position of the bar has been characterized as a mere
love of a choice of forum," but whatever the motive of the bar may
be in opposing restriction of the present diversity jurisdiction, and de-
spite the belief of certain scholars that diversity is a tool for public
service, neither procedural differences that may make the federal courts
more attractive than state courts nor the fact that cases may come to
trial sooner in federal court than in state court can justify maintaining
a dual court system for the vindication of rights created by state law.
The free flow of ideas for improvement between the two systems
is also advanced as a value of diversity jurisdiction, a value that would
5 Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 193-94 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
6 STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1,
105-08 (Official Draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL DRAFT].
7 COMM'N ON REVIsOiN OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES; RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), App. D, 176. Letter from
Mr. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Senator Roman L. Hruska, May 29, 1975 [herein-
after cited as Mr. Chief Justice Burger's letter]; Currie, The Federal Courts and the
American Law Institute, Part 1, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1968).
8 1971 Hearings at 182, 199.
9 Id. at 189, 203; Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Juris-
diction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1426, 1449 (1964).
10 1971 Hearings at 249-306.
11 See Wright, Restructuring Federal Judisdiction: The American Law Institute Pro-
posals, WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185, 206 (1969).
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be lost if it were eliminated." It is not reasonable to assume, as this
argument does, that there will become two bars-a federal bar handling
federal cases and a state bar handling state cases, with no members in
common and with no contact between the two groups, to the end that
neither group is aware of what goes on in the other's practice before
its courts. Furthermore, ideas can and do move from one system to
the other, other than by way of a common bar. There are, for example,
legal periodicals in which innovative ideas can be and are discussed,
and there is the work of groups such as the American Law Institute
which undertake to study legal institutions and, based upon that study,
to recommend changes. It can be asserted that elimination or re-
striction of diversity jurisdiction will have a negligible impact on the
flow of ideas within the entire legal community.
The fear that federal courts will become specialized courts if robbed
of diversity jurisdiction 3 also fails to recognize the realities of the
present system. Every day federal courts decide cases brought under
federal question jurisdiction by looking to the law of the states, either
because Congress has referred them to state law14 or because there is
no congressional mandate and an answer is compelled by pending liti-
gation. I' This process is not halted by abolishing diversity. Further-
more, Congress continues to enact, with increasing frequency, legisla-
tion reaching into many aspects of this nation's social and economic
life.'" The vast array of federal legislation and the litigation flowing
therefrom must be ignored in order to conclude that the federal courts
will become overly specialized. Limiting the federal courts to federal
litigation should be considered, not as overspecialization, but as an
efficient and productive specialization.
On the other hand, there are compelling reasons to advocate the
elimination of diversity jurisdiction-given the nature of the federal
system and the dramatic increase in the workload of federal courts.
Our federal system contemplated that state law would govern in
the resolution of most of the controversies arising from everyday life
and provided for federal competence only in those areas in which the
national Constitution or statutes deprived the states of competence or
provided for an overriding federal law. In the years following Swift v.
12 1971 Hearings at 256-57; Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE
L.J. 7, 11-12 (1963); Moore & Weckstein, supra note 9, at 1449-50.
13 See, e.g., Moore & Weckstein, supra note 9, at 1449.
14 E.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672, 2764 (1970).
15 See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLu . L. REv. 489
(1954); Miskin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957).
16 See Judd, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 938 (1974).
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Tyson, 7 the federal courts did not follow the original design, but, with
the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 8 the notion that state de-
cisional law was not controlling in cases between citizens of different
states was laid to rest. The federal judiciary is now obligated to follow
this mandate of constitutional dimension19 and to discover and apply
the substantive law of the state in any diversity action before it.
Erie brought into sharp focus the proper role of the federal judi-
ciary in the administration of state law. Nevertheless, Erie and its
progeny have not relieved the burden imposed upon the federal judici-
ary of determining, in many cases, just what the applicable state law is,
or, in the absence of any state expression on a given matter, what the
state law would be determined to be if the matter had been presented
to the state court. This task has not always been an easy one, and it
has from time to time invited conflicts between the two systems. It is
in keeping with the principles of federalism to do away with what
amounts to an intrusion into the ambit of the state courts, and to re-
strict the federal courts to their proper function of dealing with federal
litigation.
A pressing problem from a practical standpoint is the workload
in the federal courts. Federal political power has expanded steadily
since Reconstruction days and has caused a concomitant growth in the
jurisdiction of the federal courts."0 This has been particularly true in
recent years, and the end of this expansion is not in sight. Mr. Chief
Justice Burger has said that there is likely to be so much additional
jurisdiction thrust upon the federal courts over the next decade that
they will do well to perform those functions alone without having also
to handle diversity cases. 2"
In 1975, of the total of 117,230 civil cases commenced in United
States District Courts, 30,631 were diversity of citizenship cases.22 This
amounts to approximately 26 percent of the federal trial courts' filings.
In the United States Courts of Appeal 1,745 of the 13,679 appeals
filed-nearly 13 percent-were diversity appeals.2 3 These figures take
1741 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19 See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 693 (1974); Miskin,
Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1682, 1685, (1974);
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of The New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383,
385-98 (1964).
20 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 516, 530 (1928); Friendly, supra note 2, at 510.
21 Mr. Chief Justice Burger's letter.
2 2 ADuMNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTS, 1975 ANNf. REP. OF TH
DmECTOR, App., Table C-2, at A-14.
23 Id. Table B-8, at A-10.
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on additional significance when considered together with an increase of
from 2412 weighted filings per U.S. District Court judgeship in 1962 to
400 such filings per judgeship in 1975.24 In the circuit courts, the case-
load per judgeship has grown from 82 in 1966 to 172 in 1975.5 It
cannot be denied that repeal of diversity jurisdiction would relieve sub-
stantially the pressure now being felt by the federal trial bench and the
circuit courts, and it would undoubtedly have some impact even at the
Supreme Court level.
It should also be noted that increasing the number of federal judge-
ships is not a complete answer to handling the workload. In 1975 there
were 396 district judgeships as compared to 289 in 1961, yet the work-
load per judgeship is heavier now than it has ever been."6 Similarly,
an increase from 78 circuit judgeships in 1961 to 97 in 1975 has been
accompanied by a substantial increase in the workload per judgeship.
Appointing more federal judges without limiting federal jurisdiction
only attracts more cases to the federal courts.2"
What are the prospects for total elimination of diversity jurisdic-
tion? Unfortunately, they are dim at the present. Hopefully, congres-
sional restriction may be in the offing.
Movement toward a reexamination of diversity jurisdiction began
in 1959, when Mr. Chief justice Warren, in an address to the annual
meeting of the American Law Institute, said:
It is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional balance be-
tween the federal and state court systems, assigning to each system
those cases most appropriate in the light of the basic principles of
federalism.29
In response to this suggestion, the Institute undertook an eight-
year study to determine a rational allocation of the country's litigation
between the state and federal courts. This study culminated in the
publication of an Official Draft in 1969. This draft, in turn, formed
the basis for the contents of the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of
1971." The American Law Institute Study and, subsequently, the Fed-
24 Id. at XI-124. (The term "weighted filings" takes into account not only the number
of cases filed but also the judicial time required by different types of cases. In calculating
it, more credit is given for an antitrust action than for a routine automobile accident case.)
25 Id. at X-15. (Cases are normally bandied by a panel of three judgeships, so the
per-judgeship figures must be multiplied by three to show the true burden on individual
judges.)
26 See note 24 stepra & text accompanying. (The figures quoted above do not include
territorial courts.)27 See note 25 supra & text accompanying.
28.1971 Hearings at 129.
290 rcm DaArr at 1.
Sa S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
1976]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
eral Court Jurisdiction Act, undertook a thorough revision of all aspects
of federal jurisdiction.31
The most important restriction on diversity jurisdiction which has
been proposed denies an in-state plaintiff the right to invoke the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal court sitting in that state because his adver-
sary is an out-of-state citizen.32 If diversity jurisdiction must be re-
tained in some form, this change is highly desirable. It would reduce
the number of diversity of citizenship cases filed in federal court by
approximately 50 percent.38 At the same time, it would add less than
one percent to the caseload of the state courts. 4 Furthermore, it would
eliminate what has long been considered an unfair advantage of the in-
state plaintiff over the in-state defendant.35 It should be added that it
would also rid diversity jurisdiction of what, when viewed against the
historical justification for such jurisdiction, is one of its most irra-
tional aspects.
Other significant changes which would reduce diversity jurisdic-
tion involve (1) treating a foreign corporation with a permanent estab-
lishment in a state as if it were a local citizen with regard to its local
activities, thus denying it diversity jurisdiction originally or on re-
moval ;36 (2) denying a commuter or other person whose principal place
of business or employment is in a state in which he is not a citizen the
right to invoke diversity jurisdiction in the state where he works ;3 and
(3) treating an executor or other personal representative as a citizen
of the same state as the decedent or other person represented, thus
eliminating the possibility of creating or destroying diversity by any
such appointment."8
The provision relating to foreign corporations would also apply
to an unincorporated association, 9 which is made a citizen of the state
31 The changes proposed in federal question jurisdiction, admiralty and maritime juris-
diction, and other changes are not within the scope of this article and will not be discussed.
See, e.g., 1971 Hearings, pt. 2; OFFICIAL DRAFT at 24-93, 162-422; H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute, Part II, Federal Question Jurisdiction, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 286 (1969);
Field, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 46 F.R.D. 141 (1969).
321971 Hearings at 10; OFFICIAL DRAFT at 12.
38 1971 Hearings at 128; Letter from Norbert A. Halloran, Division of Procedural
Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to U.S. District
Judge Howard Bratton, Oct. 15, 1975.
34 1971 Hearings at 128.
85Lumberman's Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 524.
361971 Hearings at 10; OFFICLAL DRAFT at 13.
3 1971 Hearings at 11; OFFICIAL DRAFT at 13.
381971 Hearings at 11; OFFICIAL DRAFT at 13.
391971 Hearings at 10; OFFICIAL DRAFT at 13.
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in which it has its principal place of business by another proposed
change,40 so that neither can invoke diversity jurisdiction in a state in
which it has a local establishment. This procedure, as well as the com-
muter provision, has been attacked as an unworkable rule that will breed
threshold litigation,41 and it has been suggested that the impossibility
of defining corporate citizenship is one more reason why diversity
juirsdiction should be repealed entirely.42 Of the three, only the pro-
posed personal representative rule has not been criticized and, in fact, has
been regarded as an improvement over the existing rule.43
On the whole, the above proposals for restricting diversity juris-
diction are inadequate. Moreover, some proposed amendments 44 would
enlarge the jurisdiction in some measure. Some proposed restrictions
would be cumbersome, and one might be tempted to discount the whole
set of proposals relating to diversity on this ground. However, that
would only leave us with the present system, which is even less at-
tractive.4 5
The American Law Institute proposals embodied in S. 18764' rep-
resent the only effort that has so far been made to remove from the
federal courts business that belongs in the state courts. Even a partial
measure is better than none at all. The overall effect of its adoption
would be to substantially reduce the number of diversity of citizenship
cases filed each year in federal courts. In 1971, S. 1876's prospects for
adoption were not promising, particularly in regard to the diversity
provisions.47 It is unlikely that the climate of opinion has changed
401971 Hearings at 8; OsiclAL DRAr at 10.
411971 Hearings at 247; Fraser, Proposed Revision of the Jurisdiction of the Federal
District Courts, 8 VALPARAmSo L. REv. 189, 193-95 (1974).4 2 Currie, supra note 7, at 36-45.
43 id. at 15-16.
4 4 See 1971 Hearings at 13, 58-68, 131, 147, 308-11; OrIcrAL DaFr at 16-17, 67-76.
45See Wright, supra note 11, at 186-92. Professor Wright grades the present allocation
of jurisdiction between the state and federal courts in terms of rationality, clarity, efficiency,
and the promotion of harmony between the two systems. He finds it irrational-jurisdiction
is allocated on the basis that it has been done that way in the past. He believes that the
present rules do not adequately apprise a lawyer of reasonable intelligence where he
should bring his lawsuit and lead to extensive preliminary litigation to decide where the
case should be heard or require wasteful duplication of proceedings. Finally while he be-
lieves that the present rules do fairly well in avoiding unnecessary friction between the
two court systems, he points out that they could be better. With regard to diversity juris-
diction, he thinks that the A.L.L proposal permitting removal at the outset of a case by
a single defendant even though other defendants are of such citizenship that they cannot
remove is an improvement, as is the A.L.I. proposal that the state court may complete the
trial when the case becomes removable during the trial, so that, if the case is remanded,
judgment can be entered. See OFfiCIAL DAFr at 357-60.
40 The Judicial Conference of the United States has taken the position that the proposals
contained in S. 1876 were "well conceived, workable and based upon acceptable compromise"
of the differing views of the bench and bar.
471971 Hearings, pt. 2, at 761.
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dramatically enough to permit complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction,
but it is to be hoped that at least the American Law Institute proposal
will soon be enacted into law.
If the preceding pages have served no other purpose, it is hoped
they have shown that times and circumstances change and that what
may have been responsive to the needs of the past is not likely to meet
the needs of the present. Ultimately, there should be a fair and rational
allocation of the nation's litigation based upon the principle that, since
state courts are the authoritative expositors of state law under our
system, they should be the courts where such issues are tried, and upon
the principle that federal courts should be limited to their proper role
as national courts dealing with litigation affecting federal rights. Until
that time, the American Law Institute diversity jurisdiction proposals
represent a step in the right direction.
